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The Comparative Law of Climate Change: A 
Research Agenda 
 
Michael Mehling* 
 
Climate change defies traditional models of academic enquiry; its scale and complexity 
strain the explanatory power of established thought, prompting the espousal of new, fluid 
concepts and calls for greater interdisciplinarity. Law, with its rigid doctrines and 
ostensibly dated insistence on binary categories, appears particularly unsuited as a 
framework of analysis. But as this article submits, the legal method offers a unique vessel 
to infer collective understandings of the climate challenge, helping bridge the divide 
between facts and norms that characterizes other intellectual paradigms. A shifting focal 
point from international to domestic climate action suggests the particular utility of 
comparative law, which can identify policy barriers and drivers, and add a vital dimension 
to the study of policy learning and transfer. Invoking the epistemic value of legal exegesis, 
this article proposes a research agenda for comparative analysis in a rapidly evolving issue 
area, which, although not yet a field of law in its own right, offers many opportunities for 
fruitful study: the law as it relates to climate change. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Comparative law is not usually thought of in terms of its epistemic strength. It is an 
instrumental exercise that is expected to yield useful insights into the commonalities and 
differences of legal systems, at best allowing deduction of normative patterns that 
transcend the boundaries of geography and time. As this article suggests, however, 
comparative legal analysis may hold an underappreciated promise: to provide access, 
through an established methodology, to the expression of collective will embedded in the 
law. In the case of technically complex and morally contingent challenges such as climate 
change, this capacity of comparative study may contribute to our understanding of the 
opportunities for meaningful solutions, as well as the obstacles to their implementation. 
Following a discussion of the epistemology of climate action and the role of jurisprudence 
therein, this article therefore proposes a research agenda for comparative legal analysis in 
the context of climate change.  
 
LAW AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF CLIMATE ACTION 
 
AN UNFULFILLED CONSENSUS 
 
                                                 
* Corresponding author. 
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µClimate change is the greatest threat faced by humankind¶ Thus, or in similar terms, have 
leaders in government and administration,1 industry,2 faith,3 civil society4 and academia5 
described the climate challenge, reflecting widespread public concern about the expected 
consequences of a changing atmosphere.6 Long a matter of contention,7 the underlying 
science has mostly become settled, supported by growing evidence of early climate 
impacts.8 Yet remarkably, while the threat of climate change has been acknowledged at the 
highest levels of public authority for over half a century,9  progress in addressing its 
principal cause ± the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere ± has been 
consistently outpaced by emissions growth in most parts of the world.10 Even recurrent 
                                                 
1 µ&OLPDWHFKDQJHLVWKHGHILQLQJLVVXHRIRXUDJH:HKDYHQHYHUIDFHGVXFKDFKDOOHQJH¶%DQ.i-moon 
(Secretary-General of the United Nations), µOpening Remarks at 2014 Climate Summit¶ (New York, 23 
September 2014), found at: 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=2355#.VdSvSod7ye0>. µ$QG
no challenge ± no challenge ± poses a greater threat to future generations than climate change.¶%2EDPD
(President of the United States), µRemarks by the President in State of the Union Address¶ (Washington, DC, 
20 January 2015), found at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-
state-union-address-january-20-2015>. 
2 µ&OLPDWH FKDQJH LV D FULWLFDO FKDOOHQJH IRU RXU ZRUOG.¶ %* *URXS et al., Letter to Her Excellency Ms. 
Christiana Figueres and His Excellency Mr. Laurent Fabius (1 June 2015), found at: 
<http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/press-releases/oil-and-gas-majors-call-for-carbon-
pricing.html>. 
3 µ>7@KHJUDYHVWFKDOOHQJHWKDWKXPDQLW\KDVHYHUIDFHG.¶7*\DWVRth Dalai Lama) et al., µThe Time to 
Act is Now: A Buddhist Declaration on Climate Change¶ (14 May 2015), found at: 
KWWSZZZHFREXGGKLVPRUJEFSDOOBFRQWHQWEXGGKLVWBGHFODUDWLRQ!µ&OLPDWHFKDQJHLVDJOREDOSUREOHP
with grave implications.¶-0%HUJRJOLR3RSH)UDQFLVEncyclical Letter Laudato si¶ of the Holy Father 
Francis on Care for Our Common Home (Rome, 24 May 2015), found at: 
<http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-
laudato-si.html>, at paragraph 25. See also ,QWHUQDWLRQDO ,VODPLF &OLPDWH &KDQJH 6\PSRVLXP µ,VODPLc 
'HFODUDWLRQ RQ *OREDO &OLPDWH &KDQJH¶ ,VWDQEXO -18 August 2015), found at: 
<http://islamicclimatedeclaration.org/islamic-declaration-on-global-climate-change>. 
4 µ&OLPDWHFKDQJHLVOLIHRUGHDWK,WLVWKHQHZJOREDOEDWWOHILHOG¶ Wangari Maathai, winner of the Nobel 
Peace Prize, cited in: -9LGDOµ*OREDO:DUPLQJ&DXVHV'HDWKVD<HDU6D\V.RIL$QQDQ7KLQNWDQN¶
The Guardian (29 May 2009). 
5 µ&OLPDWHFKDQJHLVWKHJUHDWHVWFKDOOHQJHRIRXUWLPH.¶7)6WRFNHU&R-Chair of Working Group I of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), cited in: -*LOOLVµ81&OLPDWH3DQHO(QGRUVHV&HLOLQJ
RQ*OREDO(PLVVLRQV¶New York Times (27 September 2013). 
6 3HZ5HVHDUFK&HQWHUµ&OLPDWH&KDQJH6HHQDV7RS*OREDO7KUHDW¶(Pew Research Center, 2015), found 
at: <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2015/07/Pew-Research-Center-Global-Threats-Report-FINAL-July-
14-2015.pdf>. 
7 For a discussion of the politicization of climate science, see D. Demeritt, µ7KH &RQVWUXFWLRQ RI *OREDO
Warming and the Politics of Science¶, 91:2 Annals of the Association of American Geographers (2010), 307; 
12UHVNHVµ7KH6FLHQWLILF&RQVHQVXVRQ&OLPDWH&KDQJH¶Science (2004), 1686. 
8 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2014), at 4; World Bank, Turn Down the Heat: 
Confronting the New Climate Normal (World Bank Group, 2014), at xvii. 
9 See, e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the US Congress (Washington, DC, 8 February 1965): 
µAir pollution is no longer confined to isolated places. This generation has altered the composition of the 
DWPRVSKHUHRQDJOREDOVFDOHWKURXJKDVWHDG\LQFUHDVHLQFDUERQGLR[LGHIURPWKHEXUQLQJRIIRVVLOIXHOV¶ 
10 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (Cambridge University Press, 2013), at 12-13. 
affirmations of the technical feasibility 11  and economic rationale of broad 
decarbonization12 have failed to spur momentum for adequate action,13 casting a surreal 
light on admonitions, published with predictable regularity, that the µwindow of 
opportunity¶ to avoid dangerous climate change is perpetually about to close.14 
 
Academic scholarship has dedicated considerable resources across multiple disciplines to 
diagnose the reasons for this µJOREDOZDUPLng gridlock¶.15 A challenge distinct from other 
environmental threats, anthropogenic climate change originates in diffuse and virtually 
ubiquitous activities, with boundless geographic scope matched only by an almost 
indefinite time horizon. Lingering uncertainties about climate sensitivity and damage 
functions impede a straightforward assessment of the costs and benefits of different policy 
options,16  creating an exceptionally wide realm of acceptable discourse for the many 
asymmetrical interests ± both narrow individual and broad societal ± affected by climate 
change or a policy response.17 It is this confluence of scale, complexity, and contingence 
that has prompted climate change to be designated D µVXSHU-ZLFNHG¶ SUREOHP, 18 
engendering a political debate fraught with ideological acrimony.19 
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
And there, precisely, lies the diagnostic potential of academic research. When a threat of 
unrivalled magnitude is largely confirmed and technical solutions have become widely 
                                                 
11  On environmental problems that resist a solution despite availability of technical solutions, see R. 
&RVWDQ]DµSocial Traps and Environmental Policy¶:6 Bioscience (1987), 407, at 408. 
12 F. Calderón et al., Better Growth, Better Climate: The New Climate Economy Report (Global Commission 
on the Economy and Climate, 2014); J. Channel et al., Energy Darwinism II: Why a Low Carbon Future 
'RHVQ¶W+DYHWR&RVWWKH(DUWK (Citi, 2015); Council of Economic Advisers, The Cost of Delaying Action to 
Curb Climate Change (Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2014); J. Sachs et al., Pathways 
to Deep Decarbonization (Sustainable Development Solutions Network et al., 2014); N. Stern (2007), The 
Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007). On the importance of the economic cost 
of policy, see R. Pielke, Jr., The Climate Fix: What Scientists and Politicians Won't Tell You About Global 
Warming (Basic Books, 2010), at 46. 
13 2QWKHSHUVLVWHQW µHPLVVLRQVJDS¶EHWZHHQFXUUHQWO\FRPPLWWHGDQGVFLHQWLILFDOO\DGPRQLVKHGHPLVVLRQ
reductions, see United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), The Emissions Gap Report 2014 (UNEP, 
DWVHHDOVR'+HOPµClimate-&KDQJH3ROLF\:K\+DV6R/LWWOH%HHQ$FKLHYHG"¶, 24:2 Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy (2008), 211. 
14 6HHPRVWUHFHQWO\HJDQHGLWRULDO LQDOHDGLQJDFDGHPLFMRXUQDOµ:LQGRZRI2SSRUWXQLW\¶Nature 
Climate Change (2014), 1037. 
15 (%6NROQLNRIIµ7KH3ROLF\*ULGORFNRQ*OREDO:DUPLQJ¶Foreign Policy (1990), 77. 
16 W.D. Nordhaus, The Climate Casino: Risk, Uncertainty, and Economics for a Warming World (Yale 
8QLYHUVLW\ 3UHVV  56 3LQG\FN µ7KH &OLPDWH 3ROLF\ 'LOHPPD¶ :2 Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy   0/ :HLW]PDQ µ)DW 7DLOV DQG WKH 6RFLDO &RVW RI &DUERQ¶ 
American Economic Review (2014), 544. 
17 See A. Fleming et al. µ&KDOOHQJLQJ'RPLQDQW'LVFRXUVHVRI&OLPDWH&KDQJH¶ Climatic Change 
(2014), 407. 
18 5/D]DUXVµ6XSHU:LFNHG3UREOHPVDQG&OLPDWH&KDQJH5HVWUDLQLQJWKH3UHVHQWWR/LEHUDWHWKH)XWXUH¶
94:5 Cornell Law Review (2009), 1153, going back to +:-5LWWHODQG00:HEEHU µ'LOHPPDV LQD
*HQHUDO7KHRU\RI3ODQQLQJ¶:2 Policy Sciences (1973), 155. 
19  M. Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction, and 
Opportunity (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
available, the absence of a suitable response ± despite nearly universal endorsement ± 
cannot be properly explained by the natural or applied sciences. If anything, one should 
seek an answer from the disciplines traditionally focused on human behaviour and 
individual or collective decision making. Among these, economics stands out for its 
disproportionate influence on climate policy, 20  ascribing climate change to different 
market failures21 and unrestricted access to the atmosphere as a common pool resource.22 
With a coherent paradigm and expanding use of empirical methods, it introduces numerical 
precision and the promise of objectivity ± both highly seductive to policy makers ± in an 
ideological debate. But where the elegant abstractions and corrective prescriptions23 of 
mainstream economics are known to fall short is in their ability to account for the social, 
institutional, and cultural dimensions of climate change, not to mention the irrationality of 
the attendant politics.24 
 
Other social sciences have long claimed that territory as their domain. With its high stakes, 
diverse actors and comprehensive scope, climate change has attracted different areas of 
social research as a fertile source of case studies and proven testing ground for hypotheses. 
And this wealth of research has undoubtedly contributed explanatory value by studying 
how societies perceive the threat of climate change and organize around common 
responses. Owing to the diverse toolbox of social scientists, we now have a better 
appreciation for the role of institutions, interests, and ideas in shaping climate action. More 
widespread use of evidence-based methods, in particular, has fundamentally changed our 
                                                 
20 Affirming that trained economists have dominated IPCC Working Group III author teams for several 
assessment reports, for instance: E. Corbera et al.µPatterns of Authorship in the IPCC Working Group III 
5HSRUW¶ Nature Climate Change (2015, forthcoming), at 3; A %MXUVWU|P DQG 0 3RON µ3K\VLFDO DQG
(FRQRPLF%LDV LQ&OLPDWH&KDQJH5HVHDUFK$6FLHQWRPHWULF6WXG\RI ,3&&7KLUG$VVHVVPHQW5HSRUW¶, 
108:1 Climatic Change '9LFWRUµ(PEHGWKH6RFLDO6FLHQFHVLQ&OLPDWH3ROLF\¶:7545 Nature 
(2015), 27; IRUWKHUHOHYDQFHRIHFRQRPLFVJHQHUDOO\VHH:-0F.LEELQDQG3-:LOFR[HQµ7KH5ROHRI
(FRQRPLFVLQ&OLPDWH&KDQJH3ROLF\¶ 16:2 Journal of Economic Perspectives (2002), 107. 
21 &OLPDWHFKDQJHZDV IDPRXVO\GHVFULEHGDV µWKHJUHDWHVWPDUNHW IDLOXUH WKH ZRUOGKDVHYHUVHHQ¶E\ N. 
Stern, n. 12 above, at viii. More aptly, however, it is the result of several failures of the market to allocate 
goods and services efficiently, including positive and negative externalities, the bounded rationality of 
economic actors, and information asymmetries; for DVHPLQDOGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSWVHH)0%DWRUµ7KH
$QDWRP\RI0DUNHW)DLOXUH¶Quarterly Journal of Economics (1958), 351. 
22 E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), at 15. 
23 Mainly an explicit or implicit carbon pricing to internalize the social cost of emissions, see A. Bowen, The 
Case for Carbon Pricing (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011); on the importance of 
internalizing the externalities of polluting behaviour, see: W.J. Baumol and W.E. Oates, The Theory of 
Environmental Policy, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, 1988), at 155. 
24 Criticizing the narrow focus of neoclassical economics on the individual choices of rational actors in the 
PDUNHWSODFH5-%UXOOHDQG5('XQODSµ6RFLRORJ\DQG*OREDO&OLPDWH&KDQJH,QWURGXFWLRQ¶LQ5(
Dunlap and R.J. Brulle (eds.), Climate Change and Society: Sociological Perspectives (Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 1, at 8; heterodox schools of economics, such as institutional and behavioural economics, which 
include psychological, social, cognitive, and emotional factors in their analysis of economic choices, still 
face paradigmatic challenges, such as the methodological focus on marginal change, the identification of a 
discount rate for long time scales, questions of distribution, and how to value irreversible damages, see 
JHQHUDOO\16WHUQµ(WKLFV(TXLW\DQGWKH(FRQRPLFVRI&OLPDWH&KDQJH3DSHU6FLHQFHDQG3KLORVRSK\¶
30:3 Economics and Philosophy DQG16WHUQµ(WKLFV(TXLW\DQGWKH(FRQRPLFVRI&OLPDWH
&KDQJH3DSHU(FRQRPLFVDQG3ROLWLFV¶Economics and Philosophy (2014), 445. 
understanding of the effects of different policies on human behaviour and the 
environment.25 Likewise, innovative technologies to assemble and process large sets of 
empirical data promise the discovery of previously unknown correlations and causal 
pathways. 
 
And yet, despite these advances in our knowledge base, we are forced to concede that the 
climate challenge remains as intractable as ever, with efforts to formulate a commensurate 
response becoming, if anything, more circuitous and open-ended. A cynical observer might 
even claim that most important insights from the social sciences were already revealed 
decades ago, and that contributions since have been largely limited to providing greater 
nuance and granularity, occasionally applying new, imaginative labels to familiar 
phenomena. A cursory survey of climate research by two leading social scientists, for 
instance, affirms remarkable consistency in diagnosis and central policy recommendations 
over multiple decades.26 That their recommendations have not found implementation over 
such a long period of time raises the question whether we also face a µUHVHDUFKJULGORFN¶± 
a condition where scholarly enquiry has become trapped in a recursive cycle of self-
referential investigation, accentuated by periodic variations on the underlying themes, and 
with aspirational prescriptions forever unable to capture the coarse realities of practice. 
 
If all we can hope for from the social sciences going forward are incremental improvements 
in our understanding of the reasons for inaction, observing how the first- and second-best 
policy recommendations of pure theory are ignored or altered in the political process and 
± often enough symbolic ± compromises enacted in their stead, anyone hoping to 
meaningfully advance the climate effort could be forgiven for bypassing academic research 
altogether, likening the exercise to the rearrangement of deck chairs on a sinking vessel. 
But the scientific process rarely produces instant solutions, least of all for sweeping 
challenges such as climate change; and if there is a solution, it will almost certainly not be 
a simple one. Every insight, however small, on the human dimensions of this unique threat 
forms an important contribution to a larger epistemic process, out of which the countless 
                                                 
25 6(5\DQ&+HEGRQDQG-'DIRHµ(QHUJ\5HVHDUFKDQGWKH&RQWULEXWLRQVRIWKH6RFLDO Sciences: A 
&RQWHPSRUDU\([DPLQDWLRQ¶Energy Research & Social Science (2014), 186, at 193. 
26 Four decades ago, economist W.D. Nordhaus discussed solutions ranging from emissions reductions ± 
even mentioning a phase-out of fossil fuels ± to emissions sequestration and what is now commonly known 
as geoengineering; see W.D. Nordhaus, Can We Control Carbon Dioxide? (International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, 1975), at 6-8; this catalogue of options, along with his preferred policy recommendation, 
a price on carbon emissions, recur in his 2013 book The Climate Casino, n. 16 above, at 221. Likewise, his 
diagnosis that climate change is an externality problem that incentivizes freeriding can be traced back to 
W.D. Nordhaus, Strategies for the Control of Carbon Dioxide (Yale University, 1977), at 19-20, and also 
underlies his recent Presidential Address to the American Economic Association in January 2015, published 
as: :' 1RUGKDXV µ&OLPDWH &OXEV 2YHUFRPLQJ )UHH-ULGLQJ LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &OLPDWH 3ROLF\¶ 
American Economic Review (2015), 1339. Meanwhile, the scepticism about comprehensive, legally binding 
institutions for climate governance based on universal participation and quantified targets and timetables 
expressed in research by political scientist D.G. Victor can be consistently tracked across two decades of 
research starWLQJZLWK'*9LFWRUµ+RZWR6ORZ*OREDO:DUPLQJ¶:6309 Nature (1991), 451, through 
'*9LFWRUDQG-(6DOW µ.HHSLQJ WKH&OLPDWH7UHDW\5HOHYDQW¶:6512 Nature (1995), 280, to D.G. 
9LFWRU µToward Effective International Cooperation on Climate Change: Numbers, Interests and 
,QVWLWXWLRQV¶  Global International Politics (2006), 90, and D.G. Victor, Global Warming Gridlock 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
fragments of our aggregate response will ultimately emerge. But still, to propose an answer 
to the query raised earlier in this section, the social sciences hold no monopoly on the 
correct answer to climate change. 
 
A ROLE FOR JURISPRUDENCE 
 
One aspect of the climate threat that has arguably been insufficiently addressed is its 
normative dimension. Although the explanatory value of empirical research cannot be 
overstated, no amount of observation can replace the difficult value judgments involved in 
determining the proper course of action.27 Humanities, and notably ethics, play an essential 
role in understanding different concepts of value and justice, the underlying arguments, 
and how they might guide our choices.28 In the pluralist breadth of its prescriptions, ethics 
also serves as a powerful testament to the normative contingency of climate change.29 
Another normative discipline that has played a largely subordinate role in the debate about 
climate change is jurisprudence, 30  and this essay asks whether the law, and more 
specifically comparative law, offers an underutilized tool to understand, predict, and shape 
climate policy choices. But what might a discipline contribute that neither provides 
observational insight based on empirical analysis, nor can ascend a scaffolding of robust 
theory to summon innovative policy designs? 
 
Overall, the legal profession enjoys a paltry reputation in the context of climate policy, and 
has even been implicitly blamed for the slow progress in finding a global solution.31 
Lawyers will generally be invited to apply their professional skills to climate policy only 
when legal technicalities are at stake, for instance to comment on a legal dispute or the 
legality of a proposed measure. In part, this relative isolation of the legal discipline can be 
ascribed to its distinctive terminology, professional culture, and a claim to authority based 
on reflexive interpretation of legal sources rather than observation of measurable 
phenomena. In the language of systems theory, law forms a closed, autopoietic social 
                                                 
27  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate 
Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2014), at 213-214; see also O. Edenhofer and M. 
.RZDUVFK µCartography of Pathways: A New Model for Environmental Policy Assessments¶ 
Environmental Science & Policy (2015), 56. 
28 For excellent overviews of the attendant issues, see D.A. Brown, Climate Change Ethics: Navigating the 
Perfect Moral Storm (Routledge, 2012); S.M. Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of 
Climate Change (Oxford University Press, 2011); J. Garvey, The Ethics of Climate Change: Right and Wrong 
in a Warming World (Bloomsbury Academic, 2008); D. Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle 
Against Climate Change Failed ± And What It Means for Our Future (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
29 For an illustration of how ethical arguments of distributive and corrective justice can also result in very 
different policy prescriptions, contrast E.A. Posner and D. Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (Princeton 
University Press, 2010); and H. Shue, Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection (Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
30 See, e.g., S.J. Adams-6FKRHQHWDOµ$5HVSRQVHWRWKH,3&&)LIWK$VVHVVPHQW¶Environmental Law 
Reporter (2015), 10027. 
31 See, e.g., economist J. Sachs, quoted in: µ81,VVXHGZLWK5RDGPDSRQ+RZWR$YRLG&OLPDWH&DWDVWURSKH¶
The Guardian -XO\DVVD\LQJRIWKH81)&&&QHJRWLDWLRQSURFHVVµ,WSXWWKHODZ\HUVRXWIURQWDQG
left the technologists out of the room, and the result is that we have had 21 years of lawyering and no success 
LQDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOIUDPHZRUN¶ 
system that postulates binary statements on the legality ± or lack thereof ± of individual 
and collective behaviour.32 Any measure taken by public authorities, for instance, will 
emerge into a densely populated system of doctrines, rules, and principles across all areas 
of social life33 that determine its validity and shape its implementation. Lawyers operating 
within this system will communicate in their professional vernacular as they leverage an 
established canon of hermeneutic methods to unlock the normative patterns woven into the 
dense fabric of the law. Although they can also step back and take an external view on the 
law and how it affects the world,34 other disciplines ± such as sociology and anthropology 
± provide more valuable tools for an external observation;35 but knowledge of the law and 
how it operates ± that is, proficiency in legal exegesis ± remains indispensable to 
understand its internal logic and dynamic application. 
 
Trained in the distinctive methods of their discipline, lawyers can make an important 
contribution to the epistemology of climate action. At this time in human history, where 
faith in universal truths based on a foundational premise has been largely replaced by a 
fluid pluralism of secular ideas, 36  the only way of accessing a challenge involving 
unprecedented degrees of complexity, uncertainty and moral contingency is arguably 
through a consensual approach, built on a process of orderly discourse between free and 
equal subjects.37  In democratic societies, lawmaking provides a structured process of 
deliberation and justification to distil a multitude of contending perceptions and interests 
into a uniform narrative38 that, importantly, also affords participatory rights to otherwise 
marginalized segments of society.39 Unquestionably, the processes of law creation are, 
even at their best, far from the ideal of enlightened discourse,40 and therefore must entail 
                                                 
32 G. Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell Publishers, 1993); N. Luhmann, Das Recht der 
Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp, 1993), at 38. 
33 $V1LNODV/XKPDQQGHVFULEHGLWµ>D@OOFROOHFWLYHKXPDQOLIHLVGLUHFWO\RULQGLUHFWO\VKDSHGE\ODZ/DZ
is, like knowledge, an essential and all-pervasive fact of the social condition. No area of life ± whether it is 
the family or the religious community, scientific research or the internal networks of political parties ± can 
find a lasting social order that is not based on law.¶ N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1985), at 1. 
34 )(ZDOGµ7KH/DZRI/DZ¶LQ: G. Teubner (ed.), Autopoietic Law: A New Approach to Law and Society 
(Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 36. 
35 ( gUF µ'HYHORSLQJ &RPSDUDWLYH /DZ¶ LQ: E. Örücü and D. Nelken (eds.), Comparative Law: A 
Handbook (Hart, 2007), 43, at 48. 
36 At least in large parts of the world, if not all; see generally Z. Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Polity, 2000); 
U. Beck, Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne (Suhrkamp, 1986); A.C. MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). 
37 For the theoretical foundations of such a consensus theory of truth, see the °XYUH of Jürgen Habermas on 
the theory of communicative action, e.g.: J. Habermas Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zu einer Theorie des 
kommunikativen Handelns (Suhrkamp, 1984), at 177-178; for alternative proposals to harness collective 
judgment for complex and contingent proEOHPVVHH6)XQWRZLF]DQG-5DYHW]µ6FLHQFHIRUWKH3RVW-Normal 
$JH¶Futures (1993), 735; J. Surowiecki, The Wisdom of Crowds (Doubleday, 2004); and, in a narrower 
VHQVH03RODQ\Lµ7KH5HSXEOLFRI6FLHQFH,WV3ROLWLFDODQG(FRQRPLF7KHRU\¶:1 Minerva (1962), 54. 
38 J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung (Suhrkamp, 1992), at 499.  
39 While it may do so for marginalized groups in the present, it offers little accountability towards future 
generations, see H. Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische 
Zivilisation (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979), at 55. 
40 Aggregative concepts of democracy have been recognized to face numerous challenges, for instance the 
disproportionate impact of powerful interest groups, a passive citizenry, or information asymmetries among 
an unconditional commitment to further improvement; but for better or for worse, law 
currently offers the most formal expression of political consensus, enshrining the outcomes 
of contentious political debate in the categories of material rules and principles. 
 
As a direct result, barriers to climate action may also be deeply embedded in the sediment 
of law as principles and doctrines, some of which may even far predate our knowledge of 
climate change. Indeed, the legal system is, by its very nature, a conservative force in 
society, sustaining the normative patterns and understandings that precipitated the climate 
crisis in the first place.41 Using the methods of their profession, lawyers can draw on this 
substrate to infer defensible interpretations through an established process of legal 
reasoning,42 bringing to light previously concealed obstacles to climate ambition, mapping 
the space for permissible action, and, wherever necessary, applying accepted criteria to 
balance the tensions and conflicts that will inevitably arise across different rights, duties, 
and objectives in the context of climate change.43 One need not subscribe to notions of the 
intrinsic determinacy of the law44 to recognize that its routines offer, on a practical level, 
greater transparency and certainty than raw anarchic debate, creating a space for discourse 
in which the legal process moderates the extremes that often dominate political 
deliberation. 
 
Like the social sciences, therefore, law and its methods will not reveal a miraculous 
solution to the threat of climate change; but lawyers can do more than resolve disputes or 
ascertain the legality of climate policy proposals: in a debate characterized by a cacophony 
of competing voices, they offer access to the most robust expression of collective will, and 
do so through a process that perpetuates ± as much as possible ± the legitimacy of its 
interpretations, ultimately increasing the acceptability of practical outcomes.  
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its members, see J.F. Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (MIT Press, 
2000); J.S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford 
University Press, 2000). Critics have therefore suggested that periodic elections and the principal-agent form 
of representation as an expression of aggregate preferences are insufficient bases of political authority, which 
instead needs to be justified to all those who will be bound by it through a process of collective reasoning 
and active public debate, see A. Gutmann and D. Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton 
University Press, 2004). For a scathing critique of parliamentary democracy, see C. Schmitt, Die 
geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parliamentarismus (Duncker & Humblot, 1923). 
41 F. Capra and U. Mattei, The Ecology of Law: Toward a Legal System in Tune with Nature and Community 
(Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2015). 
42 For an authoritative discussion, see N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Clarendon Press, 
1978), at 265-274. 
43 For an interpretive theory based on the notion of the integrity of law, see R.M. Dworkin, /DZ¶V(PSLUH
(Harvard University Press, 1986), at 90. 
44 6HHIRULQVWDQFH50'ZRUNLQµ1R5LJKW$QVZHU"¶LQ: P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds.), Law, Morality, 
and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart (Clarendon Press, 1977), 58, at 58±84. 
Applying a jurisprudential paradigm to broader societal debates is not a new idea, and has, 
for instance, been proposed to better understand and improve international environmental 
governance.45 Climate change is, of course, the quintessential global challenge, crying out 
for better governance at the international level.46 So if law and the legal profession are to 
play a role in its solution, it would stand to reason that international law ± the law 
traditionally governing the conduct of nation States ± is the most appropriate level of 
engagement. And indeed, for more than two decades, the international community focused 
its efforts on diplomatic negotiations under the auspices of a multilateral treaty, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).47 But as negotiations 
have repeatedly broken down, regained momentum, and faltered again, attention has 
increasingly shifted to the national and even local level,48 prompting extensive debate 
about the merits of international law and casting doubt on the possibility of a 
comprehensive global solution.49 
 
What matters, however, is that this pivot has not only occurred in isolated strands of 
academic scholarship: Against a backdrop of at best sporadic progress in the international 
negotiations, domestic climate action has positively flourished in the last handful of 
years.50 Along with this shifting centre of gravity come far-reaching implications for the 
role of law in climate policy. Unlike the realm of international relations, where lawless 
anarchy is the default condition unless punctuated by ratified treaty obligations or the 
elevated threshold of general international law,51 domestic jurisdictions are entirely built 
around a dense structure of binding, hard rules. A central barrier to multilateral 
                                                 
45  W.F. Baber and R.V. Bartlett, Consensus and Global Environmental Governance: Deliberative 
Democracy in Nature's Regime (MIT Press, 2015), at 31. 
46 See, e.g.-%:LHQHUµThink Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Change Policies¶:6 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2007), 1961. 
47 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (New York, 9 May 1992; in force 
21 March 1994). 
48 E. DiringHUµClimate Change: A Patchwork of Emissions Cut¶:7467 Nature (2013), 307. 
49 See, e.g..:$EERWWµ7KH7UDQVQDWLRQDO5HJLPH&RPSOH[IRU&OLPDWH&KDQJH¶:4 Environmental 
Planning C (2011), 571; S. Barrett and M. Toman, Contrasting Future Paths for an Evolving Global Climate 
Regime :RUOG%DQN52.HRKDQHDQG'*9LFWRUµ7KH5HJLPH&RPSOH[IRU&OLPDWH&KDQJH¶
9:1 Perspectives on Politics   6 5D\QHU µ+RZ WR (DW DQ (OHSKDQW $ %RWWRP-up Approach to 
&OLPDWH3ROLF\¶:6 Climate Policy 5%6WHZDUW02SSHQKHLPHUDQG%5XG\Nµ$1HZ
6WUDWHJ\IRU*OREDO&OLPDWH3URWHFWLRQ¶:1 Climatic Change (2013), 1; D.G. Victor, J.C. House, and S. 
-R\µ$0DGLVRQLDQ$SSURDFKWR&OLPDWH3ROLF\¶:5742 Science (2005), 1820. For an excellent overview, 
see A.J. Jordan et al. µ(PHUJHQFHRI3RO\FHQWULF&OLPDWH*RYHUQDQFH DQG LWV )XWXUH3URVSHFWV¶ Nature 
Climate Change (2015, forthcoming). 
50 See, e.g., M. Nachmany et al., The 2015 Global Climate Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change 
Legislation in 99 Countries (GLOBE International et al., 2015); N.K. Dubash et al. µ'HYHORSPHQWV LQ
1DWLRQDO&OLPDWH&KDQJH0LWLJDWLRQ/HJLVODWLRQDQG6WUDWHJ\¶Climate Policy (2013), 649; and below, 
text accompanying n. 85 to 89. 
51 PCIJ 7 September 1927, The Case of the 66µ/RWXV¶)UDnce v. Turkey), [1927] PCIJ Ser. A, No. 10, at 
µ5HVWULFWLRQVXSRQWKHLQGHSHQGHQFHRI 6WDWHVFDQQRW«EHSUHVXPHG¶6RPHGHJUHHRIODZPDNLQJKDV 
now been conceded to international bodies such as the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, although 
WKH ERXQGDULHV UHPDLQ VRPHZKDW KD]\ VHH - %UXQQpH µ&23LQJ ZLWK &RQVHQW /DZ-making under 
0XOWLODWHUDO(QYLURQPHQWDO$JUHHPHQWV¶:1 Leiden Journal of International Law (2002), 1; R.R. Churchill 
DQG * 8OIVWHLQ µ$XWRQRPRXV ,QVWLWXWLRQDO $UUDQJHPHQWV LQ 0XOWLODWHUDO (QYLURQPHQWDO $JUHHPHQWV $
Little-QRWLFHG3KHQRPHQRQLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ¶:4 American Journal of International Law (2000), 623. 
cooperation, the prospect of free riding by recalcitrant States,52 plays only a subordinate 
role in the domestic context, where public authority can coerce its subjects to observe 
climate mandates. Precisely this enforceability of domestic law is what has motivated many 
to place their hopes for climate progress on national and local rather than international 
action. Even successfully negotiated international arrangements take recourse to domestic 
law for their implementation, with transposition proving the Achilles heel of many an 
environmental regime;53 conversely, enactment of domestic law yields valuable experience 
and fosters debate that can increase the willingness to commit internationally.54 Given this 
pivotal role of domestic law in any effort to control climate change, the disproportionate 
attention bestowed on international diplomacy and institution building by the academy may 
seem surprising, although it will arguably persist, and for good reasons.55 
 
WHY COMPARATIVE LAW? 
 
If we agree that the focal point of climate action has shifted to the domestic level, we also 
have to ask ourselves what framework is best suited to study the legal ramifications of the 
transition. Where international lawyers have, by definition, dominated research on 
international climate cooperation within the legal discipline, no natural counterpart has 
emerged for domestic climate law. In fact, as will be shown in the next section, the very 
boundaries of this subject area remain in question, complicating its assignment to any 
established field of legal research. Lawyers with very diverse backgrounds, from 
environmental law to financial and energy market regulation, have engaged in the study of 
climate change and its intersection with domestic law; and while appropriate to the varied 
nature of the climate challenge, this eclectic approach is unlikely to provide a coherent 
paradigm for systematic investigation. 
 
A defining feature of the climate challenge ± its global scope ± provides useful guidance 
on the question of suitable framing: Just as no single jurisdiction can solve climate change 
alone, it stands to reason that no particular legal system will yield all the insights that can 
potentially be garnered from academic study. Bearing in mind the urgency of climate 
                                                 
52 See W.D. Nordhaus, n. 26 aboveDWµ)UHH-riding occurs when a party receives the benefits of a public 
JRRGZLWKRXWFRQWULEXWLQJWRWKHFRVWV¶ 6HHDOVR&*ROOLHUDQG-7LUROHµNegotiating Effective Institutions 
$JDLQVW &OLPDWH &KDQJH¶  Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy (2015), 5; J. Stiglitz, 
µ2YHUFRPLQJ WKH &RSHQKDJHQ )DLOXUH ZLWK )OH[LEOH &RPPLWPHQWV¶  Economics of Energy & 
Environmental Policy (2015), 29. 
53  0 0HKOLQJ µ%HWZL[W 6F\OOD DQG &KDU\EGLV" (IIHFWLYHQHVV LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO (QYLURQPHQWDO /DZ¶ 
Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2002), 129. 
54 T. Townshend and A.C.T. Matthews, National Climate Change Legislation: The Key to More Ambitious 
International Agreements (Climate & Development Knowledge Network, 2013), at 2, citing C. Figueres, the 
Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC DVVD\LQJµNothing is going to be agreed internationally until enough is 
legislated GRPHVWLFDOO\¶; see also T. Townshend et al.µ+RZ1DWLRQDO/HJLVODWLRQ&DQ+HOSWR6ROYH&OLPDWH
&KDQJH¶Nature Climate Change (2013), 430, at 430; T. Townshend et al.µ/HJLVODWLQJ&OLPDWH&KDQJH
DWWKH1DWLRQDO/HYHO¶Environment (2011), 5, at 5. 
55 For a persuasive discussion of the importance of an international perspective, see W. Hare et al.µThe 
Architecture of the Global Climate Regime: A Top-down Perspective¶Climate Policy (2010), 600; 
the author also thanks an anonymous reviewer for reminding him about the significance of competitiveness 
and related concerns for political support of unilateral action. 
change, one might therefore argue that we cannot afford an overly narrow perspective. On 
the contrary, if law is to expand our understanding of the possibilities for addressing 
climate change, we should broaden the analysis to encompass as many different 
experiences and circumstances as possible, fostering a high level of policy learning and 
diffusion, and helping avoid costly mistakes. Rather than focus on a specific area of law in 
a specific jurisdiction, hence, this article suggests that the most promising approach to 
process insights across numerous legal systems will be one of comparative analysis. 
 
As highlighted by Morgera in the introductory article to this special issue, comparative law 
is an established field of legal enquiry that focuses on the legal rules or norms, categories, 
and institutions in two or more legal systems to infer degrees of similarity and difference, 
drawing conclusions that the analysis of each system alone would not yield.56 It allows the 
legal scholar to contrast a chosen feature of the law against its foreign counterparts, 
resulting in a dialectic perspective for knowledge progression.57 What it also takes into 
account, moreover, is the role of context.58 In an area as fraught with political and moral 
disagreement as climate change, it would be tempting to focus only on the most visible 
manifestation of norms, codified law. Yet existence of a written law does not necessarily 
say much about its social relevance, 59  nor can the dynamics of its formulation and 
implementation be fully understood without taking into account broader socioeconomic 
circumstances. 60  Comparative lawyers are therefore often encouraged to consider all 
factors that influence the structure, development and content of a particular legal system, 
including the µeconomic and political systems, political ideology, history, geography and 
GHPRJUDSKLFIDFWRUV¶.61 
 
                                                 
56 (0RUJHUDµ*OREDO(QYLURQPHQWDO/DZDQGWKH&RPSDUDWLYH/HJDO0HWKRG¶24:3 Review of European, 
Comparative and International Environmental Law (2015). 
57 G. Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method (Hart, 2014), at 11. 
58 With an admonition not to ignore the historical and cultural context of different legal systems, for instance: 
M.A. Glendon, P.G. Carozza and C.B. Picker, Comparative Legal Traditions, 3rd edn (Thomson West, 1999), 
at 13. 
59 The very real dichotomy between enacted laws and their social application has, of course, been one of the 
oldest preoccupations of legal theory and sociology; see, e.g., E. Ehrlich, Grundlegung der Soziologie des 
Rechts 'XQFNHUXQG+XPEORW0XQLFKDW53RXQGµ/DZLQ%RRNVDQG/DZLQ$FWLRQ¶
American Law Review (1910), 12; M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, 
III. Abteilung (J.C.B. Mohr, 1922), at 368-389. 
60 What applies to advanced industrialized economies may be even more pertinent for developing nations, 
where the socioeconomic context of codified norms may be more important than their content; different 
countries show great variations in their legal and administrative systems, their regulatory cultures, and their 
traditions of transparency, accountability and access to information ± weak enforcement capacities, less 
robust adherence to the rule of law, and an absence of effective civil society and public interest monitoring 
groups can therefore greatly undermine what would otherwise seem progressive legislation, ultimately 
rendering it symbolic; see, e.g., R.G. Bell, Choosing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Real World 
(OECD, 2003), at 11. 
61 -'DUS|DQG$1LOVVRQµ2QWKH&RPSDULVRQRI(QYLURQPHQWDO/DZ¶, 3:1 Journal of Court Innovation 
(2010), 315, at 324. 
With context, therefore, comes the question of interdisciplinarity.62 At a purely ontological 
or phenomenological level, the complexity and scale of climate change would indeed 
suggest a need to incorporate the contributions of other disciplines in an effort to 
understand the genesis, evolution, and implementation of legal responses to the 
challenge.63 And undoubtedly important synergies could be leveraged by engaging the 
epistemic outlook of neighbouring disciplines, such as the policy sciences, public 
administration, or governance studies. 64  Often these will be equipped with superior 
methods and a conceptual framework that is better suited to generate knowledge about 
socioeconomic circumstances. A good example is policy transfer studies, a research theme 
developed across several disciplines premised on the observation that successful policy 
ideas do not always diffuse from one jurisdiction to another;65 it is easy to envision how 
the insights from that research agenda can enrich our understanding of the transferability 
of legal concepts and institutions. 
 
But despite the obvious attraction of interdisciplinarity, comparative lawyers should resist 
the temptation to dilute or surrender that unique capacity of the legal method, namely to 
infer formal statements from the law which manifest the collective will embodied therein, 
as shaped and moderated by the sum of rules, principles and doctrines constituting the legal 
system. Where lawyers might feel called upon to broaden the scope of their enquiry, they 
risk venturing into areas where their native skillset places them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
disciplines with sophisticated qualitative and quantitative methods of empirical research.66 
                                                 
62 ,QWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\UHVHDUFKLVDµPRGHRIUHVHDUFKE\WHDPVRULQGLYLGXDOVWKDWLQWHJUDWHVLQIRUPDWLRQGDta, 
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National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine, Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research 
(National Academy Press, 2004), at 2. 
63 &3 &DUODUQH µ([SORULQJ 0HWKRGRORJLFDO &KDOOHQJHV within the Context of Climate Change Law and 
3ROLF\¶American Society of International Law Proceedings (2011), 255. 
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the costs and benefits of alternative forms of action or the lack thereof, or psychology and its explanations of 
individual and collective behavioural responses to different policy incentives or constraints; see, e.g., K. 
Harrison DQG/06XQGVWURPµ&RQFOXVLRQ7KH&RPSDUDWLYH3ROLWLFVRI&OLPDWH&KDQJH¶LQ K. Harrison 
and L.M. Sundstrom (eds.), Global Commons, Domestic Decisions: The Comparative Politics of Climate 
Change (MIT Press: 2010), 261, at 284-286; E. Lachapelle and M. Paterson, µDrivers of National Climate 
Policy¶, 13:5 Climate Policy (2013), 547, at 548-550; 03XUGRQµ$GYDQFLQJ&RPSDUDWLYH&OLPDWH&KDQJH
3ROLWLFV7KHRU\DQG0HWKRG¶Global Environmental Politics (2015), 1, at 2. 
65 )RUWKHVHPLQDOZRUNVHWWLQJRXWWKLVUHVHDUFKDJHQGDVHH'3'RORZLW]DQG'0DUVKµ:KR/HDUQV:KDW
IURP :KRP" $ 5HYLHZ RI WKH 3ROLF\ 7UDQVIHU /LWHUDWXUH¶  Political Studies (1996), 343; and D.P. 
Dolowitz and D. Marsh µ/HDUQLQJ Irom Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-
PDNLQJ¶Governance IRUDPRUHUHFHQWUHYLHZRIWKHVWDWHRIWKHILHOGVHH'6WRQHµ7UDQVIHU
DQG7UDQVODWLRQRI3ROLF\¶Policy Studies (2012), 483. 
66 While, admittedly, such methods can be acquired through autodidactic study, such an approach will, at 
best, place considerable demands of time and effort on the lawyer and, at worst, yield outcomes that seem 
amateurish to formally trained members of the respective discipline; one reason is the heterogeneity of 
thought even within disciplines, each of which tends to entertain its own theoretical and methodological 
Collaborating in diverse teams will offer a more practical approach to interdisciplinary 
research, although there, too, challenges ± such as ensuring equal weight and 
communication across disciplines ± need to be overcome.67 
 
On a deeper and more problematic level, interdisciplinarity can introduce the subtle value 
judgments, ideological orientations and ontological assumptions underlying other 
disciplines, or characterizing specific schools or theoretical paradigms within those 
disciplines.68 When interpreted through such external layers of normativity, the expression 
of collective will embedded in the law can easily become distorted. Lawyers may exercise 
an important corrective function by applying the exegetic skills of their profession, which, 
although not immune to instrumentalization, are still better suited to identifying the formal 
consent expressed within the law. Without venturing into a debate about the politics of 
interdisciplinarity, however, it may be safe to argue that lawyers will make the greatest 
contribution to knowledge progression by remaining sensitive to disciplinary boundaries 
and focusing on questions that leverage their distinct methodology, comparing features of 
the law from an internal point of view.69 A tentative research agenda, with questions that 
genuinely harness a comparative legal approach, will be suggested later in this article. But 
first, the common subject of analysis, in this case the legal response to climate change, calls 
for a clearer definition in order to make comparisons across jurisdictions.70 
 
CLIMATE LAW: A NASCENT FIELD OF LAW? 
 
Even if one rejects the limitation of comparative analysis to functionally equivalent 
features in each legal system,71 a high degree of conceptual precision is advisable to ensure 
that the object of juxtaposition, the tertium comparationis, is ± if not teleological 
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InterdisciplinDULW\¶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67 + /HGIRUG µ7HDP 6FLHQFH¶  Nature (2015), 308, at 310-311; in greater depth, V. Strang, 
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 Journal of Environment, 
Development and Sustainability (2009), 1, at 6. 
68 Here, for instance, one might think of the vastly different worldviews and assumptions underlying realist, 
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69 -&5HLW]µ+RZWR'R&RPSDUDWLYH/DZ¶:4 American Journal of Comparative Law (1998), 617, at 
628, citing W. (ZDOGµ&RPSDUDWLYH-XULVSUXGHQFH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:KDW:DV,W/LNHWR7U\D5DW"¶:6 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review (1995), 1889, at 1972-1973. In a sense, this view also underlies the functional 
method endorsed by many comparative law scholars, who recommend framing the analysis around common 
functions in each VXUYH\HGMXULVGLFWLRQDQGFXWWLQJWKHVHµORRVHIURPWKHLUFRQFHSWXDOFRQWH[WDQGVWULSSHGRI
WKHLURZQQDWLRQDOGRFWULQDORYHUWRQHV¶VRDVWRDYRLGEHLQJLQIOXHQFHGE\GRPHVWLFSUHFRQFHSWLRQV; see K. 
Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press, 1998), at 44. 
Admittedly, and somewhat inconsistently, Zweigert and Kötz also variously endorse consideration of 
socioeconomic factors other than the law. 
70 See J.C. Reitz, n. 69 above, at 620; on the importance of clear definitions for comparative analysis: T. 
)RUV\WK DQG / /HYLGRZ µ$Q 2QWRORJLFDO 3ROLWLFV RI &RPSDUDWLYH (QYLURQPHQWDO $QDO\VLV 7KH *UHHQ
(FRQRP\DQG/RFDO'LYHUVLW\¶Global Environmental Politics (2015), 140. 
71 See, notably, K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, n. 69 above, at 32-47. 
counterparts in each jurisdiction 72  ± at least accurately defined and sufficiently 
circumscribed to allow for meaningful comparison. When comparing how legal systems 
have evolved in response to climate change, an intuitive first step would be to ask whether 
this evolution has given rise to a discrete body of law across jurisdictions, a discovery that 
would, in itself, be a noteworthy outcome of comparative analysis. 
 
Going purely by the volume of academic activity, one might readily conclude that such an 
area of law has emerged, spawning a considerable number of university courses and 
textbooks, publications, and affiliated institutions. 73  But on its own, the vibrancy of 
scholarly output is hardly a sufficient indicator for a new area of law. What really asks for 
an answer is whetKHUFOLPDWHFKDQJHKDVUHVXOWHGLQDµFRKHUHQWDXWRQRPRXVERG\RIODZ
or [is] nothing more or less than the application of national and international law to climate 
SUREOHPV¶74 Aside from being of academic interest, classification as a distinct field of law 
has real consequences: it can send a political signal and legitimize a topic, facilitate analysis 
and communication of the law, streamline its application for greater operational efficiency, 
and ultimately render it more adequate to the scale and impact of a societal project than a 
disjointed patchwork of unrelated rules and doctrines.75  
 
No universal or even widely agreed set of criteria exist as to what constitutes an 
autonomous body of law, however, nor where thresholds for the degree of coherence and 
autonomy should be set.76 Sociologically, the emergence of a new area of law might be 
acknowledged through consensus within the epistemic community of legal professionals;77 
materially, it can find its expression in a system of rules unified by common, overarching 
                                                 
72 See J. Darpö and A. Nilsson, n. 61 above, at 318. 
73 See, e.g., the journals Climate Law (Brill) and Carbon & Climate Law Review (Lexxion); course textbooks 
such as R.G. Hildreth et al., Climate Change Law: Mitigation and Adaptation (West, 2009); J. Nolon and P. 
Salkin, Climate Change and Sustainable Development Law in a Nutshell (West Academic Publishing, 2010); 
H.M. Osofsky and L.K. McAllister, Climate Change Law and Policy (Aspen, 2012); C. Wold, D. Hunter and 
M. Powers, Climate Change and the Law, 2nd edn (LexisNexis, 2013); M. Winkler, Klimaschutzrecht (Lit 
Verlag, 2005); essay collections such as T. Bonyhady and P. Christoff (eds.), Climate Law in Australia 
(Federation Press, 2007); G. Van Calster, W. Vandenberghe and L. Reins (eds.), Research Handbook on 
Climate Change Mitigation Law (Edward Elgar, 2015); M.B. Gerrard and J. Freeman (eds.), Global Climate 
Change and U.S. Law, 2nd edn (American Bar Association, 2015); E.J. Hollo, K. Kulovesi and M. Mehling 
(eds.), Climate Change and the Law (Springer, 2013); M. Peeters, M. Stallworthy and J. de Cendra de 
Larragán, Climate Law in EU Member States: Towards National Legislation for Climate Protection (Edward 
Elgar g, 2012); academic institutes such as the Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School; 
and postgraduate programs such as the LLM in Climate Change and Energy Law and Policy at the University 
of Dundee; the joint LLM in Energy, Environmental and Climate Change Law at the University of Malta and 
the University of Leuven; the LLM in Global Environment and Climate Change Law at the University of 
Edinburgh; and the LLM in Climate Change Law and Policy at the University of Strathclyde. 
74 16LQJK*KDOHLJK µ7KH:KDW+RZDQG:KHUHRI &OLPDWH/DZ¶ LQ: R. Heffron and G. Little (eds.), 
Delivering Energy Law and Policy in the EU and US: A Reader (Edinburgh University Press, forthcoming). 
75 -%5XKODQG-6DO]PDQµ&OLPDWH&KDQJH0HHWVWKH/DZRIWKH+RUVH¶Duke Law Journal (2013), 
DW(6KHUZLQµ/HJDO3RVLWLYLVPDQGWKH7D[RQRP\RI3ULYDWH/DZ¶LQ: C.E.F. Rickett and R. 
Grantham (eds.), Structure and Justification in Private Law: Essays For Peter Birks (Hart, 2008), 103, at 
119. 
76 See J.B. Ruhl and J. Salzman, n. 75 above, at 989. 
77 H. Schulze-)LHOLW]µ8PZHOWUHFKW¶LQ':LOORZHLWHGRechtswissenschaft und Rechtsliteratur im 20. 
Jahrhundert (C.H. Beck, 2007), 989, at 990. 
objectives, principles, and instruments that engender recognizable patterns and allow a 
useful distinction from other areas of law.78 In perhaps the most rigorous attempt to answer 
WKLV TXHVWLRQ WZR FRPPHQWDWRUV DSSOLHG D µVWDWLRQDULW\ DVVHVVPHQW¶ borrowed from 
resource and infrastructure management to conclude that climate change was not 
VXIILFLHQWO\WUDQVIRUPDWLRQDOWRZDUUDQWµVZHHSLQJGRFWULQDOFKDQJH¶WKURXJKGHYHORSPHQW
of a new field of law.79  
 
And yet, it is clear that the advent of climate change has fundamentally impacted law 
making and implementation across various thematic areas and levels of authority. Several 
scholars have therefore suggested a more pragmatic definition of climate law as the sum of 
legal norms pertaining to climate change mitigation and adaptation.80 And for the purposes 
of legal comparison, such a definition might provide a sufficient heuristic, although it also 
is likely to pose methodological challenges. Unlike established areas of law, many of which 
have been shaped through systematic application and development over several 
generations, the legal response to climate change has developed in a far shorter and more 
arbitrary manner, often triggered by suddenly emerging needs. 
 
As a result, this body of rules neither displays the organized structure, nor the internal 
consistency and doctrinal strength, of more traditional areas of law. Because of its 
crosscutting nature, moreover, climate change has prompted the adoption of new rules 
across a wide range of legal sectors, such as environmental law, energy law, financial 
services regulation, and planning law, while also affecting core areas of law such as 
constitutional, administrative, tort, and property law. Its ambiguous boundaries have 
therefore elicited suggestions that it be considered a transversal area of law with a weak 
core of proprietary objectives and principles, drawing on more established fields for much 
                                                 
78 W. Erbguth, Rechtssystematische Grundfragen des Umweltrechts (Duncker & Humblot, 1987), at 24; see 
DOVR76$DJDDUGµ(QYLURQPHQWDO/DZDVD/HJDO)LHOG$Q,QTXLU\LQ/HJDO7D[RQRP\¶:1 Cornell Law 
Review (2010), 221DWDµILHOGRIODZPXVWH[KLELWVRPHGHJUHHRIFRPPRQDOLW\DFKDUDFWHULVWLFRUVHW
of characteristics shared in common by the situations that arise within the area of law that the field 
encompasses. Commonalities establish patterns that cohere the ILHOG « 2QO\ ZKHQ WKH FRPPRQ
characteristics are legally relevant do the materials they encompass appear as an identifiable corpus.¶ 
79 See J.B. Ruhl and J. Salzman, n. 75 above, at 1013, focusing on climate adaptation. Similarly, calling it a 
SRWHQWLDOO\QDVFHQWDUHDRI ODZ µin statu nascendi¶66FKODFNH µ.OLPDVFKXW]UHFKW ± ein Rechtsgebiet? 
%HJULIIOLFKHV6\VWHPDWLNXQG3HUVSHNWLYHQ¶Die Verwaltung, Suppl. 11 (2010), 121, at 152. 
80 See, e.g.ZLWKDYLHZWRWKH$XVWUDOLDQFRQWH[W-3HHOµ&OLPDWH&KDQJH/DZ7KH(PHUJHQFHRID1HZ
/HJDO'LVFLSOLQH¶:3 Melbourne University Law Review DWµDQDFFXPXODWLRQRIFDVHODZ
legislDWLYHGHYHORSPHQWDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHJXODWLRQWKDWPDNHVXSDGLVWLQFWLYHERG\RIOHJDOSULQFLSOHVDQG
UXOHV LGHQWLILHG DV ³FOLPDWH FKDQJH ODZ´¶ WKH *HUPDQ FRQWH[W .) *lUGLW] µ(LQIKUXQJ LQ GDV
.OLPDVFKXW]UHFKW¶Juristische Schulung (2008), 324, DWµGLH6XPPHGHUMHQLJHQ5HFKWVQRUPHQGLH
GDV.OLPDYRUDQWKURSRJHQHQ(LQZLUNXQJHQVFKW]HQVROOHQ¶ IRUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV-&'HUQEDFh and S. 
.DNDGHµ&OLPDWH&KDQJH/DZ$Q,QWURGXFWLRQ¶:1 Energy Law Journal DWµ7KHHPHUJLQJ
law of climate change is being constructed at the intersection of several areas of law, including environmental 
ODZHQHUJ\ODZEXVLQHVVODZDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ¶%HFDXVHODZDVDVRFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQRSHUDWHVWKURXJK
rules that guide human behaviour, the scope of this body of norms would by necessity be limited to our 
collective and individual responses to climate change, both in terms of addressing its causes as well as 
protecting against its impacts, see H. van Asselt, M.A. Mehling and C. Kehler Siebert, µ7KH &KDQJLQJ
$UFKLWHFWXUHRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO&OLPDWH&KDQJH/DZ¶LQ: G. Van Calster et al., n. 73 above, 1, at 5. 
of its normative substance.81 In particular, the affinity between legal responses to climate 
change and the field of environmental law may prove challenging whenever the 
comparative analysis is levelled at areas of overlap. Because of its historical emergence as 
an environmental concern, climate change has commonly been framed as a problem of 
environmental law, with ensuing rulemaking often based on existing legislative and 
regulatory powers for pollution control,82 albeit employing different instruments.83 But 
compelling reasons have been given why this link to environmental law may be 
counterproductive, narrowing the options available to society in the struggle against a 
pervasive global threat.84 
 
A recent survey of climate legislation in 99 countries worldwide concedes that definitions 
DUH µQRW FOHDU FXW¶ DQG FKRRVHV WR HQFRPSDVV µOHJLVODWLRQ RU UHJXODWLRQV SROLFies and 
decrees with a comparable status, that refer specifically to climate change or that relate to 
reducing energy demand, promoting low carbon energy supply, tackling deforestation, 
promoting sustainable land use, sustainable transportation, or adaptation to climate 
LPSDFWV¶85 As the authors explain, relying on an explicit reference to climate change ± 
which might have avoided the foregoing question of ambiguity ± would have risked 
excluding provisions that are relevant to mitigation or adaptation without being deliberately 
identified as such. While their definition only underscores the lack of normative coherence, 
it also illustrates that a pragmatic approach to the question at hand can yield very valuable 
insights. Applying this functional understanding, the survey affirms that the number of 
climate change laws and policies has doubled every 5 years since 1997, rising from only 
54 laws and policies in 1997 to 804 by the end of 2014.86 Additionally, it observes that 58 
countries have adopted framework laws or policies to address climate change,87 attesting 
                                                 
81 See, e.g., H.-J. Koch, µ.OLPDVFKXW]UHFKW=LHOH,QVWUXPHQWHXQG6WUXNWXUHQHLQHVQHXHQ5HFKWVJHELHWV¶
in: Gesellschaft für Umweltrecht (ed.), Dokumentation zur 34. wissenschaftlichen Fachtagung der 
Gesellschaft für Umweltrecht e.V. 2010 (Erich Schmidt Verlag, 2011), 41, at 50; proposing its conception as 
DµSURFHGXUDORYHUOD\¶ZLWKFRRUGLQDWLQJIXQFWLRQVDFURVVGLIIHUHQWDUHDVRIODZ, see J.B. Ruhl and J. Salzman, 
n. 75 above, at 1019. 
82 7UDFLQJKRZFOLPDWHFKDQJHKDVEHHQVLWXDWHGZLWKLQHQYLURQPHQWDOODZDVDµW\SLFDOSROOXWLRQSUREOHP¶
-&1DJOHµ&OLPDWH([FHSWLRQDOLVP¶:1 Environmental Law (2010), 53, at 88. 
83 Contrasting the use of ambient environmental quality targets in most areas of conventional pollution 
control to the mass- or rate-based emission limitation and reduction targets prevalent in legislation and 
UHJXODWLRQRQWKHPLWLJDWLRQRIFOLPDWHFKDQJH&+LOVRQµ,W¶V$OO$ERXW&OLPDWH&KDQJH6WXSLG(xploring 
WKH5HODWLRQVKLS%HWZHHQ(QYLURQPHQWDO/DZDQG&OLPDWH/DZ¶:3 Journal of Environmental Law (2013), 
359, at 364-365. 
84 &3&DUODUQHµ'HOLQNLQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO(QYLURQPHQWDO/DZDQGClimate Change¶:1 Michigan Journal 
of Environmental & Administrative Law (2014), 1, at 4. While Carlarne levels her challenge against the 
consignment of climate change within the boundaries of international environmental law, many of her 
arguments for mainstreaming climate change across legal fields also hold ground on the domestic plane. 
85 See M. Nachmany et al., n. 50 above, at 30. 
86 Ibid., at 12; approximately half of these acts were passed by the legislative branch, and the other half by 
the executive branch. 
87 Describing these as laws, or regulations with equivalent status, that serve as a comprehensive, unifying 
basis for climate change policy and address multiple aspects or areas of climate change mitigation or 
adaptation (or both) in a holistic, overarching manner. Ibid., at 28. 
their particular importance in driving climate action.88 And finally, while 45 countries 
accounting for over 75 per cent of global emissions have adopted economy wide mitigation 
targets for 2020 or beyond, it finds that a majority of countries have at best minimal climate 
change risk assessments.89 
 
Clearly, the degree of normative development in areas relevant to climate change 
mitigation and adaptation has been nothing short of remarkable. Yet despite this 
unprecedented proliferation, it would seem prudent to assume that climate change has not 
yet given birth to an autonomous field of law. Still, as the foregoing survey shows, even an 
intuitive definition of the legal responses to climate change can serve as the basis for useful 
analysis. For the time being, therefore, a pragmatic approach to the issue of tertium 
comparationis will arguably be the best we can hope for, compelling the comparative 
lawyer to be transparent about conceptual assumptions and terminological limitations. But 
even if a nascent body of common objectives and principles may eventually justify 
FRQFHGLQJ WKH H[LVWHQFH RI D GLVWLQFW ILHOG RI µFOLPDWH ODZ¶ ± perhaps, as some have 
VXJJHVWHGLQWKHVHQVHRIDµSURFHGXUDORYHUOD\¶WKDWFXWVDFURVVYDULRXVDIIHFWHGDUHDVRI
law90 ± comparative lawyers will play an important role in populating its substantive 
doctrines and facilitating its understanding. For, as an eminent jurist once observed, the 
µKLVWRU\RIDV\VWHPRIODZLVODUJHO\DKLVWRU\RIERUURZLQJVRIOHJDOPDWHULDOVIURPRWKHU
OHJDOV\VWHPV¶91 ± and what approach could be more ideally suited for studying this process 
than comparative analysis? 
 
QUESTIONS FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
If lawyers commit to the study of climate change and its manifestations in our legal system, 
what, then, are suitable questions for comparative analysis that harness the distinct 
potential of an internal perspective on the law? At first glance, such a narrowed focus of 
enquiry would seem to place severe limitations on the types of issues amenable to 
comparative legal analysis, yet an exploratory survey suggests abundant opportunities for 
lawyers to make authoritative and relevant observations based on their training and 
professional sensibilities. Such issues include: 
 
x the role of the legal tradition, such as civil or common law, and underlying legal culture 
in how climate change is framed in the legal system; 
x the influence of constitutional organization, including federal or unitary structure, or 
allocation and separation of legislative, executive and judiciary powers, on climate 
policy development and implementation; 
x vertical and horizontal interactions between and within legal systems, and coordination 
thereof; 
                                                 
88 Ibid., with reference to S. Fankhauser, C. Gennaioli, and M. Collins, Domestic Dynamics and International 
Influence: What Explains the Passage of Climate Change Legislation? (Grantham Research Institute on 
Climate Change and the Environment and Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, 2014). 
89 See M. Nachmany et al., n. 50 above, at 12. 
90 See J.B. Ruhl and J. Salzman, n. 75 above, at 1019. 
91 R. Pound, The Formative Era of American Law (Little, Brown, 1938), at 94. 
x sectoral assignment of climate change within the legal system ± for instance to 
environmental or energy law ± and the corresponding institutional portfolio in the 
legislature and administration; 
x the normative hierarchy of relevant law, from constitutional provisions to statutory and 
substatutory law, such as regulations and decrees, and the impact thereof on the weight 
of climate change within the legal system; 
x the legal nature of objectives and principles on climate change, how these are 
operationalized, and whether they can serve as grounds for judicial action; 
x the systematic structure of relevant law, from central statute on climate change to a 
portfolio of individual laws and regulations; 
x legislative and rulemaking processes, and the effects of differences in voting 
requirements, lawmaking procedures, and stakeholder participation; 
x the impact of individual rights and freedoms on the scope of climate constraints, and the 
principles used to balance tensions or conflicts; and 
x the role and prospects of climate litigation, for instance regarding rules of evidence, 
concepts of causation, legal standing, and legal responsibility. 
 
Needless to say, this is only a partial list, yet already it is evident that there is no shortage 
of questions whose answer requires an understanding of the legal system and the methods 
and substantive doctrines of the law, thereby drawing on the specific skills of lawyers. 
Potential insights from such enquiry are by no means limited to abstract legal doctrine, and 
can have numerous ramifications for climate action in practice. 
 
Under the heading of vertical and horizontal interactions between and within legal systems, 
for instance, researchers can ask whether certain particularities of domestic law promote 
or impede international cooperation,92 or how international commitments may influence 
lawmaking at the domestic level. 93  Likewise, they can trace how legal concepts and 
principles have been transplanted across jurisdictional boundaries, and whether such 
transplants have aligned successfully with their new legal environment and the legal 
doctrines and principles observed therein. 94  Both types of interactions have arguably 
gained in importance lately, as climate cooperation between States has shifted from 
traditional diplomacy to new forms of engagement captured in notions such as 
                                                 
92 Legal constraints can limit the ability of a nation State to negotiate and ratify international treaties, or 
denying subnational jurisdictions the ability to engage in diplomatic relations, see, for instance, D.A. Wirth, 
µ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG'RPHVWLF/DZRI&OLPDWH&KDQJH$%LQGLQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO$JUHHPHQW:LWKRXWWKH
6HQDWHRU&RQJUHVV"¶Harvard Environmental Law Review (2015), 515, at 532. 
93 Applying an econometric methodology: S. Fankhauser, C. Gennaioli and M. CollinsµDo International 
Factors Influence the Passage of Climate Change Legislation?¶, Climate Policy (forthcoming, 2015)  
94 O. Kahn-)UHXQGµ2Q8VHVDQG0LVXVHVRI&RPSDUDWLYH/DZ¶Modern Law Review (1974), 1, at 5; 
A. Watson, µ/HJDO7UDQVSODQWVDQG/DZ5HIRUP¶Law Quarterly Review (1976), 79; for an application to 
the environmental context, see J.B. Wiener, µSomething Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants 
and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law¶, 27:4 Ecology Law Quarterly (2001), 1295. 
µPXOWLOHYHO¶,95 µSRO\FHQWULF¶,96 RUµWUDQVQDWLRQDO¶ODZ97 yet they also highlight how quickly 
the boundaries between fact and norm begin to blur. As societies evolve and changing 
circumstances strain the persuasiveness of jurisprudential orthodoxy, new labels such as 
the foregoing will periodically gain currency,98 offering explanatory value by refracting 
our understanding of legal responses to novel trends or developments. But lawyers opting 
to apply an internal perspective of the law need to remain vigilant when hoping to infer 
normative consequences from such novel paradigms ± for the time being, these only offer 
an alternative perspective on the law, without themselves inducing any changes to the 
underlying legal doctrines and normative relationships.99 
 
Where comparative analysis reveals differences in the way two or more legal systems 
address a challenge, lawyers can help discern which underlying factors have their origins 
in law, as opposed to the broader socio-economic context. Yet even where divergence can 
be traced back to legal particularities, no normative consequences will necessarily follow: 
the difference can simply be a given, and its observation may merely add to our 
understanding of the way law shapes behaviour. In rare cases, however, the explanation 
may itself possess normative force, for instance when a common feature across 
jurisdictions is indicative of a general principle of law, or provides evidence of habitual 
practice that indicates custom. Some authors even hope to derive universal precepts from 
                                                 
95 -3HHO/*RGGHQDQG5-.HHQDQ µ&OLPDWH&KDQJH/DZLQDQ(UDRI0XOWL-/HYHO*RYHUQDQFH¶
Transnational Environmental Law   %* 5DEH µ%H\RQG .\RWR &OLPDWH &KDQJH 3ROLF\ LQ
0XOWLOHYHO*RYHUQDQFH6\VWHPV¶ 20:3 Governance -6FRWWµ7KH0XOWL-Level Governance of 
&OLPDWH&KDQJH¶Carbon & Climate Law Review (2011), 25. 
96 E. Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change: Background Paper to the 2010 
World Development Report (WRUOG %DQN  +0 2VRIVN\ µ7KH *HRJUDSK\ RI 6ROYLQJ *OREDO
(QYLURQPHQWDO3UREOHPV5HIOHFWLRQVRQ3RO\FHQWULF(IIRUWVWR$GGUHVV&OLPDWH&KDQJH¶New York Law 
School Law Review (2013±  % 6RYDFRRO µ$Q ,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RPSDULVRQ RI )RXU 3Rlycentric 
$SSURDFKHVWR&OLPDWHDQG(QHUJ\*RYHUQDQFH¶Energy Policy (2011), 3832. 
97  /% $QGRQRYD 00 %HWVLOO DQG + %XONHOH\ µ7UDQVQDWLRQDO &OLPDWH *RYHUQDQFH¶  Global 
Environmental Politics (2009), 52; H. Bulkeley et al., Transnational Climate Change Governance 
&DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV+%XONHOH\µ7UDQVQDWLRQDO(QYLURQPHQWDO*RYHUQDQFH1HZ)LQGLQJV
DQG(PHUJLQJ5HVHDUFK$JHQGDV¶:4 Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy (2012), 556; 
T. Etty et al.µ7UDQVQDWLRQDO'LPHQVLRQVRI&OLPDWH*RYHUQDQFH¶Transnational Environmental Law 
(2012), 235. 
98  Recall, for instance, the impact on the contemporary legal debates at different points in time of 
structuralism and post-structuralism in literary science and linguistics, the positivism debate in the social 
sciences, or systems theory in biology and cybernetics, each of which introduced new concepts and left 
temporary, and in some cases permanent marks, on jurisprudence. 
99 In other words, legality or the absence thereof will remain unaffected, whether an alternative perspective 
VXFKDVµWUDQVQDWLRQDOODZ¶ is applied or not; what such a paradigm offers is ± no more and no less ± the 
DELOLW\WRKLJKOLJKWWUHQGVRUFRUUHODWLRQVZKLFKDQRUWKRGR[SHUVSHFWLYHIDLOVWRFDSWXUH:KHQµWUDQVQDWLRQDO¶
law, for instance, seeks to broaden the scope of enquiry to include private standards and codes, for instance, 
it cannot afford these instruments a legal status they otherwise lack. Over time, however, it is conceivable 
that, by refocusing attention on previously underappreciated facets of the law and its application, such 
paradigms can impel judicial bodies to change their interpretation of the law, or even prompt legislators to 
elaborate new law, resulting in very real normative consequences. 
comparative study in order to support elements of a general theory of law,100 yet there, too, 
caution is warranted against reaching overly eager conclusions. 
 
OUTLOOK 
 
Climate change defies traditional models of academic enquiry; its scale and complexity 
strain the explanatory power of established thought. Frustration over these limitations and 
the urgency of the underlying threat have motivated the pragmatic espousal of fluid 
concepts, with forceful calls for greater interdisciplinarity also resulting in a certain degree 
of methodological opportunism. Law, characterized by rigid doctrines and an ostensibly 
dated insistence on reducing the pluralism of reality to a matrix of binary norms, may 
appear particularly inadequate as a framework of analysis. Unable to draw on the 
persuasive force of empirical analysis and quantified prescription, it has, unsurprisingly, 
had far less of an impact on the broader climate debate than the natural and social sciences.  
 
But as this article has argued, the legal method offers a unique vessel to infer collective 
understandings on the causes and effects of climate change and its implications, as 
mediated by the totality of social aspirations and concerns embedded in the law. In doing 
so, it helps bridge the divide between facts and norms, affording it a vantage point that is 
unique among purely empirical or normative disciplines. Unlike economics, moreover, it 
does so not on the premise of an abstract theoretical paradigm, but based on the expression 
of consensus formally vested in the law. As the focal point of climate action shifts from 
international diplomacy to domestic policies and measures, lawyers can harness 
comparative analysis to enrich our understanding of the development and implementation 
of domestic climate action across jurisdictions.  
 
Going forward, as the body of rules with a bearing on climate change continues to expand 
and eventually may give rise to a new area of law, comparative lawyers might be charged 
with assessing whether and to what extent national legislation is sufficiently aligned to 
meet the intended nationally determined contributions of different jurisdictions, or how 
domestic policy efforts, studied within their normative context, might compare to each 
other. Beyond highlighting aspects that other disciplines might overlook, such as barriers 
to policy development originating in the normative sediment of society, comparative legal 
analysis can access the collective will embedded in the law to help interpret technically 
complex and morally contingent parameters of action, or help balance conflicts between 
multiple social ends.  
 
In the end, therefore, the comparative project extends beyond instrumental study into the 
epistemology of climate action. Where law embodies the very circumstances that have 
precipitated our climate crisis, however, detached enquiry may not always be enough. Like 
other academics, lawyers are challenged to perpetually question how their discipline helps 
uphold the forces that contribute to climate change, and, without severing the fragile 
                                                 
100 3 /HSDXOOH µ7KH )XQFWLRQ RI &RPSDUDWLYH /DZ ZLWK D &ULWLTXH RI 6RFLRORJLFDO -XULVSUXGHQFH¶ 
Harvard Law Review (1922), 838, at 855-857. 
filament of normative legitimacy that ties the law to its consenting subjects, reweave its 
fabric through defensible interpretation for a more sustainable, just and inclusive world. 
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